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简介：Thispaperstudiesaservicefirmwhosebusinesstimecanbedividedintoseveralperiods,eachprovidingdifferentvaluetocustomers.Heterogeneousserviceisamajorreasonresultinginimbalancesbetweensupplyanddemand.Sincecustomersdifferintheirdegreeofimpatience,firmscanusedifferentialpricingmechanismstooptimizetheirobjectivesandmatchsupplywithdemandineachperiod,byinducingcustomerstochoosedifferentperiods.Westudytwotypesoffirms,aninternalfirm,theobjectiveofwhichistomaximizethesystem′s(includingthefirmandallthecustomers)totalnetvalue,andacommercialfirm,whichaimstooptimizeitsownprofit.Thoughimpatiencefactorsarecustomers′privateinformation,foreachtypeoffirm,wederivetheoptimalincentivecompatiblepricingpolicy,underwhichallthecomingcustomerswillfollowthefirm′sassignment,thatis,patientcustomerswillbuytheserviceinhigh-valueperiods,buttheirwaitingtimewillbelonger,whileimpatientcustomerswillenterintothelow-valueperiods,buttheywillbecompensatedbyshorterwaitingtimes.Furthermore,intheinternalfirm,wealsoprovethatthismechanismenablesthedecentralizationofdecisions,whilemaintainingcentralizedsystem-wideoptimality.Numericalanalysisshowsthatwhenthereissufficientcapacity,theinternalfirmdoesnotalwaysneedtosetlowerpricesthanthecommercialfirmineveryperiod.

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简介：WiththedeepeningofelectricpowermarketreforminChina,themonopolyedgeofthestate-ownedelectricpowerenterpriseswilllose.Onthebasisoftheexistingpostperformancesalarymechanism,ChinesepowerenterprisesneedtooptimizetheincentivemechanismofR&Dstaff,toarousetheR&Dstaff’senthusiasmandcreativity,toadapttothenewmarketcompetitionandfurtherimprovemarketvalue.WhilsttheincentivemechanismoptimizingprocessingneedstoconsidernotonlythechangingmarketenvironmentbutalsothepersonalandworkingcharacteristicsofR&Dstaff.ThispapersummarizesthecharacteristicsofthecurrentChinesepowerenterprises’R&Dstaff:staff’stheoryqualityishigh,butinsensitivetothemarket;theyareconfrontedwithheavyworkloadanddiversifiedjobchoices;managerscanobservetheirbehaviorchoicesornot;besides,theprocessofR&DiscomplexandthemarketreactionsofR&Dachievementsareuncertain.Basedonthepremiseoftheabovefeatures,twoincentivemodelsareestablishedinthispaperfromthepointofviewofenterprisemanagers.Oneisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved;theotherisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved.Throughsolvingthemodel,weanalyzetheoptimizationpathofelectricpowerenterprisesR&Dstaffincentivemechanismundertheseconditions:(1)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved,managerscanpaymoretotheR&Dstaffwhodevelopproductswithhigheroutputvalue,inordertoencouragethemtoworkharder.(2)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved,managersshouldtakereasonablestrategiesaccordingtothedifferentsituations:a.whenR&DstaffincentivetotallydependonthemarketvalueoftheR&Dachievements,managersshouldallocateworkloadrationallyaccordingtotheirdifferenttechnicallevels;b.whenthemarketreactionsofR&Dresultsbecomemoreprecarious,managersneedtoreducetheincentiveintensitywhichbasedonthemarketvalueandraisetheirfixe

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简介：Buildingenergyefficiencyisalong-termstrategytoachievesustainabledevelopment,buttheinconsistenciesofmaininterestsduringtheimplementationleadtotheneedforgovernmentregulationinbuildingenergyconservation.Implementationofbuildingenergyefficiencyofgovernmentregulationcoversthreeaspectsofconstructionandinvolvesrelevantparticipators,sothepaperanalyzesinterestsandrolesoftherelatedsubjectsinbuildingenergysaving,explorethemotivationsanditsconversionmechanismofeachplayer,anddissectthegamerelationshipofassociatedearningsofdevelopers’andconsumers’behaviorsselectionundergovernmentcontrol.Finally,thepaperproposesbasicrequirementsofbuildingincentivepoliciesforrelatedsubjectsundergovernmentcontroltoregulatethemainbehaviorsofsubjectsinbuildingenergyefficientbuildingsandachieveenergyefficiencygoalsandbalanceofallparties’benefits.

简介：AttheprimarystageofSHPdevelopment(1960s—1970s),woodenoriron-woodenturbinesmanufacturedbyagriculturalmachineryworksweremainlyadoptedinChina.Before1949,SHPequipmentwasgenerallyimportedduetolackofdomesticmanufacturingcapability.In1952,thefirstturbine-generatorunitof800kWcapacitywassuccessfullymadeinChina,

简介：我们检验了本地社区刺激节目在Baneh城市里在三个forested村庄里改进传统的森林管理，西方的伊朗的北Zagros森林里的库尔德斯坦省。Zagros森林盖住607万哈并且支持富人植物和动物差异。在本地社区聚会和经济系统和传统的森林管理的无效的变化在最近的十年在森林新生的稳定性导致了一种批评状况。由于缺乏生产并且可耕地和产生失业和贫穷，人overexploitedZagros森林。在传统的森林管理的外面的干预创造在本地民族和森林管理组织之间的冲突。为了完成持续森林管理，包括的森林资源保存和自然资源的改进，基于社区的生计，基于森林的重要函数实现林地刺激程序(FIP)是合乎需要的。社区，本地生计上的森林的效果，和从森林提取的产品的表的socio-economics的详细信息不过从本地社区的调查被获得问询表，会见和观察。我们在三个村庄里学习了276个家庭并且在定量分析由业主完成了76张问询表。采样被简单随机的采样(SRS)执行。农村社区的需要例如家畜耕作，主要从特征和村庄的环境特征产生。我们识别了驱动力，压力，地位，影响和回答(DPSIR)设计刺激节目，由DPSIR分析和相互作用分析。来自森林的本地社区好处的评估显示了那以便改进森林管理，319美元将被每个家庭在2010作为刺激每年需要阻止砍并且收集的柴，森林降级的主要原因。