4结语
这些研究表明,认知并不单是在脑神经系统中的表征的操作;确切地说,认知最初是在活的身体的界面上进行的,只是到了认知发展的高级阶段,特别是到了符号语义的阶段,认知的内在表征方面才高度发展并成为认知活动的重要领域。在这个阶段,有赖于符号语义特性,认知不再局限于实时的(real-time)的环境,人脑的高度发展的神经系统为离线(off-line)认知准备了一个内在的、想像力的空间,认知者不再非要处于实时的环境中和实际的对象交往,于是在某种程度上,认知成了处理心理表征的过程。这也正是认知主义所聚焦的阶段,但认知主义过于孤立地看待这个阶段而无视它的发展和起源。
具身认知作为一个范式必然有其最初的观念上的变革,它有许多重要的思想先驱,目前逼近它的研究方法更是涉及众多领域。一个对认知更为全景的轮廓正在逐渐形成。参考文献:
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