简介：Thispaperinvestigatestheinfluenceoflow-carbonpoliciesonchannelcoordinationforatwo-echelonsupplychainconsistingofonesupplierandoneretailer.Fourdifferentmodelsareconsidered:thebasicmodel,thecarbonemissionmodel,thecarbonemissiontradingmodelandthecarbontaxmodel.Wefindthatthegovernmentpolicyonallcarbonemissionmodelsisnotuniversalamongthefirmsaswellasthecustomers.Thecarbonemissiontradingpolicyisalwaysbetterthanthecarbonemissionpolicyandthecarbontaxpolicywhentheallocatedcarbonemissionquotasaregreaterthanthecarbonemissions.Thecarbonemissiontradingpolicyisprovedtobeaneffectivemechanismwhichcanmotivatethesupplychaintoreducecarbonemissions.Undercertainconditions,thesupplychainprefersthecarbonemissiontradingpolicywithhighercarbonpricetootherpolicies.IntheframeworkofStackelberggamewiththesupplierastheleader,foreachcarbonpolicy,thepaperpresentscoordinationmechanismwiththeall-unitwholesalequantitydiscountcontract(AWQD).Weanalyzeandcomparetheinfluenceoflow-carbonpoliciesonchannelcoordinationforthefourlow-carbonpolicies.Numericalexperimentsareconductedtoexamineourfindings.

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简介：Inthispaper,regulatoryandoptimumprogrammingmodelhasbeenadopted.Consideringthecostsofemissionreduction,supervisionandpenalty,wewentallouttoanalyzetheoptimaldecisionofcostefficiencyofregulatorswhenimplementingthesethreepolicyinstruments:carbonemissionstandards,carbonemissiontradingpermissions,andcarbontaxesaswell.Itsresulthasindicated:Instrictaccordancewithcontroltargetoftotalcarbonemissions,regulatorsarewillingtorendersocialandeconomiccostabletoachievethegoalofoptimalcostefficiencybyregulatingcarbonemissionstandardsandsupervisingmarginalcostcausedbyvariationsintheprobability;fortunately,undertheconditionsoflowsupervisorycostandcertaincriteriawhichismet,theimplementationofcarbonemissiontradingpermissionscouldprovidesocialandeconomiccostwithopportunitiestorealizethatobjective;throughcomparativeanalysis,carbonemissiontradingpermissionshavetheadvantagesofhigherefficiencythancarbonemissionstandardsonthepremiseofincompleteinformation.Duringtheimplementationofcarbontaxesstrategy,whenthereexistsuncertaintyinformationintheenterprisesreductionbehaviors,theconditionwhichenterprisescanfullycomplywithisthetaxratelevelisnothigherthanmarginalpenaltyfunction;thetaxratelevelofenterprisesperfectcomplianceoughtnottobelowerthanthedivisionofmarginalpenaltycostandmarginalsupervisorycost.Theoptimalstrategyofenterprisesimperfectcomplianceisthatregulatorsvaryingthemarginalcostofemissionstandardsisequaltovaryingthatofsupervisoryprobability.