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简介：工业开发能充实民族生活，但是它也引起环境污染，它是在政府，消费者，和公司之中的重要担心的一个区域。政府们提出一些环境政策，它由为绿产品开发提供更大的刺激激发工业。消费者们根据他们的环境了解和态度被分类进平常的二个组和绿市场片断。在这方面，公司需要重新考虑他们的主要产品设计策略。由在顾客偏爱，公司产品策略，和政府津贴政策之中调查相互作用，这份报纸为新产品设计策略论述一个理论模型。在如此的策略的详细理论分析以后，我们发现了那激发公司选择环境地友好的产品设计策略，政府们应该使有效津贴政策就职。在同时考虑环境问题和公司好处以后，我们设计了一条津贴政策。与如此的一条政策，公司能改变他们的主要产品设计策略并且开发绿、平常的产品，从而增加公司利润并且改进全部的环境质量。

简介：Thispaperinvestigatestheinfluenceoflow-carbonpoliciesonchannelcoordinationforatwo-echelonsupplychainconsistingofonesupplierandoneretailer.Fourdifferentmodelsareconsidered:thebasicmodel,thecarbonemissionmodel,thecarbonemissiontradingmodelandthecarbontaxmodel.Wefindthatthegovernmentpolicyonallcarbonemissionmodelsisnotuniversalamongthefirmsaswellasthecustomers.Thecarbonemissiontradingpolicyisalwaysbetterthanthecarbonemissionpolicyandthecarbontaxpolicywhentheallocatedcarbonemissionquotasaregreaterthanthecarbonemissions.Thecarbonemissiontradingpolicyisprovedtobeaneffectivemechanismwhichcanmotivatethesupplychaintoreducecarbonemissions.Undercertainconditions,thesupplychainprefersthecarbonemissiontradingpolicywithhighercarbonpricetootherpolicies.IntheframeworkofStackelberggamewiththesupplierastheleader,foreachcarbonpolicy,thepaperpresentscoordinationmechanismwiththeall-unitwholesalequantitydiscountcontract(AWQD).Weanalyzeandcomparetheinfluenceoflow-carbonpoliciesonchannelcoordinationforthefourlow-carbonpolicies.Numericalexperimentsareconductedtoexamineourfindings.

简介：ThispaperexaminestheeffectofgovernmentpoliciesonthefinancingdecisionsoffirmsinChina.Arealoptionsmodelisdevelopedtounderstandhowfiscalandmonetarypoliciesaffectcorporateleverage.Themodelpredictionswillbetestedwithacomprehensivepaneldatasetspanningfrom2002to2011.Thisworkdocumentsrobustevidencethatshowthepositiveassociationofbothtaxandrisk-freeratewithfirmleverage:increaseintaxrateandriskfreeratebyonestandarddeviationresultsintheincreaseincorporateleveragesby0.61to1.06percentand2.54to3.68percent,respectively.Inaddition,theproductionsofthefirmsarenotaffectedbythetaxrateintheshortrun,andthefirmsareoperatingintheiroptimalmarketleverage.Theimpliedtaxrateandriskfreeratearesolvedbyassumingthatthefirmsachievetheiroptimalleverages.Theimpliedtaxratedeclineswiththesize,whereastheoppositegoesforimpliedrisk-freerate.

简介：Thispaperconsidersafirmthatsellsadurableproductwithagivenmarketpotential.Thepurposeofthefirmistomaximizeitsprofitbydetermininghowmuchcapacitytoinstallbeforethesaleshorizon,howmanyproductstoproduceinaccordancewiththecapacity,andhowmanyproductstosellbypricing.AppealingtoPontryaginmaximumprincipleincontroltheory,theauthorsobtaintheclosed-formsofalloptimaldecisionsthefirmshouldmake.Furthermore,theoptimalproductionrateandoptimalsalesratearebothequaltothedemandrate,whichiscausedbytheoptimalpricingpolicyduringthewholehorizon,andtheoptimalpricingpathisincreasingwiththecostofinstallingaunitofcapacity.Furthermore,numericalanalysisrevealsthevisualimpressionoftherelationshipoftheparameters.

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